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Abstract
This position paper deals with the tension between the
desire for sound and auditable assurance cases and the
current ubiquitous reliance on expert judgement. I believe
that the use of expert judgement, though inevitable, needs
to be much more cautious and disciplined than it usually
is.
The idea of assurance “cases” owes its appeal to an
awareness that all too often critical decisions are made in
ways that are difficult to justify or even to explain,
leaving the doubt (for the decision makers as well as other
interested parties) that the decision may be unsound. By
building a well-structured “case” we would wish to allow
proper scrutiny of the evidence and assumptions used, and
of the arguments that link them to support a decision. An
obstacle to achieving this goal is the important role that
expert judgement plays in much decision making. The
purpose of an assurance case is to a large extent to
redirect dependence on judgement to issues on which we
can trust this judgement; I doubt that this is done
effectively in current practice. Making arguments explicit
and if possible mathematically  formal is one of the
defences, yet formalism does not solve all problems and
even creates some of  its own. I believe that further
progress  must depend on better use of the knowledge
produced by other disciplines about the cognitive, cultural
and organizational factors that affect the production and
use of assurance cases, and on studying the successes and
failures of assurance cases.
1. “Cases” and judgement
Building a sound, well-structured “case” that collects
facts about a system and arguments linking them to
support decisions is an attractive idea. We would want
decision makers to be able to see clearly the structure of
arguments - whether built by themselves or by others -
check that the evidence is used properly, the assumptions
are acceptable, the reasoning is consistent, so that the
claims made can then be seen to deserve sufficient
confidence  to drive decisions. In everyday practice,
though, the various parts of a case tend not to be equally
sound and well-structured. The part that is most often laid
out clearly and rigorously is the raw evidence - e.g.,
results of tests and verification procedures, and
implications that can be derived from them by
straightforward algorithms. One could say that this is – in
principle – the easy part, requiring only commitment and
an adequate amount of effort. The arguments present
greater difficulties. Some possible arguments are simple -
e.g., straight statistical inference from realistic testing can
be a textbook exercise - but they are often insufficient:
they do not lend enough confidence in the claim on which
a decisions should be based. A (somewhat extreme)
example is given by applications with “ultra-high”
dependability requirements: each kind of evidence
available is usually insufficient to prove that the system is
acceptable, even if no evidence points at it not having the
required level of dependability attributes [6]. Statistical
inference from test operation does not give sufficient
confidence (within feasible testing duration), proofs do
not cover certain aspects of systems, etc. A decision
maker, e.g. a safety regulator, needs to consider these
kinds of evidence and many others – often an
unmanageable amount of evidence, in fact – and produce
a simple decision: whether the system is safe enough to
operate.
A sound case to help this regulator would detail what
can be said about, for instance: how much confidence in a
system being “safe enough” (as defined for the system
and application in question) can we expect based on the
production process used? How much does a certain period
of successful test operation add to that confidence? How
do the uncertainties about the future environment of the
system – profile of use and threats – weaken it? And what
about scenarios that have been assumed to have negligible
probabilities?
All these are difficult questions. Quite often there is no
sound scientific knowledge about the relationship
between these disparate components of the evidence and
the property that we are interested in assessing.
These difficulties are commonly solved by invoking
“expert judgement”, i.e., roughly, some subclaim (or the
main claim) will be accepted without a detailed argument
to support it, but on the basis of trust in the person (or
consensus of persons) stating it. The role of judgement
ranges from estimating individual variables – like the
probability of a certain failure mode – to drawing
conclusions from the whole complex collection of
disparate evidence and partial claims. In the former case,
the expert’s opinion is substituted in place of empirical
evidence that is not available. In the latter, it fills in for
missing scientific knowledge  and/or complex arguments.
The experts’ opinions are trusted even though their bases
cannot be examined and audited: the rules the experts
have applied, and their basis in reasoning and past
experience, may not be clear even to the experts
themselves, and anyway they are not spelled out. Indeed,
if they were spelled out in full, the case would rest on
these explicit rules and arguments (which other experts
can examine and discuss), without a need to appeal to
“judgement”.
To avoid confusion, I must say that  “judgement” is
never absent from the acceptance of an argument,
however scientifically rigorous. Scientific (or
engineering) rigour largely consist in building an
argument so that the “hard” parts – those that appear
highly vulnerable to errors and misunderstandings –  are
argued explicitly and clearly. Direct reliance on
“judgement” without explicit arguments is not eliminated,
but it is relegated  to less hard issues. For instance, we
would not require an explicit argument in order to trust
our manual verification of very simple logical or
mathematical statements used in an argument. Accepting
our direct judgement on these points prevents an infinite
recursion in the building of a case. There will also be grey
areas: statements for which some will think judgement is
sufficient, and some will require more explicit arguments.
However, when “expert judgement” or consensus is
explicitly invoked in discussing system dependability, it
is often, in my experience, to support statements about
“hard” issues.
Even on “hard” issues, reliance on expert judgement is
often necessary. Yet, the respect with which it is treated is
not always supported by evidence of its accuracy.
Actually, there is abundant anecdotal and scientific
evidence of inaccurate expert judgement. Apart from the
dangers of emotion and conflicts of interest, experimental
psychologists have documented  many types of failures of
the heuristics applied by human minds to problems
involving uncertainty and probability1, as problems of
assurance usually do. Even people trained in probabilistic
reasoning have been shown to make serious mistakes if
they tried to use “judgement” without applying explicit,
formal probabilistic reasoning. It is not the case that
                                                           
1
 There is an abundant and growing body of research about these
issues, with various accessible books on judgement under uncertainty
and expert judgement in particular. I tried to summarise its implications
from a  dependability viewpoint [8] during the EU SHIP project
(http://www.adelard.co.uk/research/ship.htm). The body of results has
grown since, and I believe it has if anything reinforced the conclusion
that expert judgement is now treated with insufficient caution.
experts are necessarily bad at dealing with uncertainty:
some experts, and some categories of experts, have been
shown to be routinely quite good. The problem is lack of
evidence that we can trust expert judgement in general
and a priori. Thus we cannot trust a priori a specific
judgement by a specific expert, unless we have some
explicit and convincing argument for doing so. Such an
argument could be for instance that the expert has both
the means for forming an accurate judgement (for
instance, that his/her experience is pertinent to the
problem at hand, and sufficiently extensive to support the
kind of claim the expert is called to make) and a record of
accurate judgement in similar circumstances.
Unfortunately, such arguments are not commonly
included in assurance cases, and I believe that in many
important applications they would not stand. The experts’
judgements may well be very accurate, but we would lack
evidence for believing them to be so; just as very
dependable systems are built for which – due to how the
development is managed and documented – we could not
build a convincing argument that they wil l be so
dependable, before they turn out to be so in operation.
Luckily, researchers have also studied how
circumstances, and especially the way tasks are set, affect
the accuracy of judgements. For instance, it appears that
people are much better at judging probabilities in settings
that require them to count events than in settings that
require reasoning directly in the more abstract language of
probabilistic calculus. Some findings concern cognitive
problems in individual judgements, some the formation of
consensus, and so on. I believe that more use could be
made of this kind of knowledge, and the community
building “assurance cases” needs better contacts with the
psychologists studying these phenomena.
2. Formalizing judgement
A possible defense, in the spirit of building assurance
cases, is simply to reduce reliance on judgement by
substituting instances of intuitive judgement with formal,
explicit, auditable arguments. For drawing  conclusions
from disparate and largely “soft” evidence, as in the
above example of the safety regulator,  a way forward
seems to be in giving the experts a way of describing the
sound argument that their mental processes emulate or
should emulate. If the description is formal and
mathematical, it will require clear statements of its
assumptions, the evidence and the general laws invoked
to support a claim. Therefore, both the author and
independent auditors will be better able to audit the
strengths and weaknesses of the argument.
At CSR and with other colleagues, we have been
studying for this purpose the use of the formalism of
“Bayesian belief networks” [2, 3, 4, 5, 7]. These have
appealing features recommending them for this task: their
graphical appearance makes it reasonably easy to describe
even complex probabilistic models, they have a clear
formal meaning, so that one can examine them for
inconsistencies or factual fallacies, and they support
probabilistic calculus for deduction and statistical
inference (so that new evidence can be incorporated into
an existing case) alike. In several projects we looked at
the potential of BBNs for turning expert judgement from
an obscure piece of magic into a logical process that the
expert can describe in explicit terms, so as to be able to
check and criticize it, and to communicate it to others for
their verification and criticism.
I believe – on the limited basis of my own experience –
that BBNs are indeed useful for these purposes. As is
common experience with mathematical formalisms, being
given a practical language for describing vague mental
processes not only allows us to describe these processes,
but encourages us to query and improve them. In the end,
a sound argument is actually created through the process
of describing it formally. I found that (small) BBNs
would help me and others to clarify and debug
probabilistic arguments.
Studying BBNs, however, led us to better recognize
some of the practical problems that are not solved by
more powerful mathematics or better notations. I believe
that these problems include:
- limited comprehension: notations that appear easy to
grasp intuitively may create false perceptions of their
“true” formal meaning. This creates problems with
the elicitation  and validation of the BBN;
-  excessive expectations: in part because of
comprehension problems, people seem to tend to
build more complex models than they can trust
themselves to validate and often even to understand;
- undue reliance on results: even results that are known
to be untrustworthy will affect decision-making.
All three problems are related to cognitive (and
emotional), group and organizational phenomena, not
directly attacked by conventional mathematical or
physical-science research. About the first problem, my
colleagues have been studying ways of showing experts
alternative viewpoints of the models they create, to clarify
what these models actually mean and imply, and whether
this is consistent with the expert’s beliefs [2, 9]. Detecting
an inconsistency would show the expert a need for
changing the formal model or questioning the expert’s
own informal beliefs. It is likely that tools with similar
functions would be useful for many of the mathematical
models we routinely use in dependability assessment, like
complex fault trees or Markov chains. In all cases,
relatively little attention has been paid so far to this aspect
of the “ergonomics” of mathematical tools: how to help
users not only to build and solve models, but also to
comprehend and debug them. The enemy here is often
complexity: although the mathematical formalism
guarantees consistency, we may still be unable to grasp
the meaning of the model we build in its entirety. For
instance, when subdividing a complex model into more
manageable and reasonably separate submodels, we may
involuntarily introduce extra assumptions that alter the
meaning of the model; or parameters that are in common
between the submodels may end up being used in subtly
inconsistent ways in the various submodels
New tools may enable us to comprehend somewhat
more complex models, or better to notice when we have
exceeded the levels of complexity that we can manage.
On the other hand, other problems will remain, including
unwillingness to heed the warnings that we may obtain
from the tools.
3. The problems outside the mathematics
The techniques just mentioned try to reduce the risk of
flaws in arguments by dealing with the technical and
scientific difficulties in building cases, which would
cause such flaws. But other factors that matter include
those that affect the choice of the form of arguments to be
pursued – since some forms will be more error-prone than
others - and the likelihood that flawed arguments will be
accepted and used.
Part of the problem seems to be a tendency to build
over-complex cases, in order to include all the disparate
evidence available about a system. It seems that, given a
wealth of evidence about a system, we have a hard time
accepting that the case we can actually build upon it may
be no stronger that what we would have if we only had a
subset of this evidence. Many kinds of evidence are
clearly relevant, but we don’t know how much they
should actually weigh. Argument that appeal to
conformance to the various requirements of a standards
(like IEC 61508) are an example. When an organization
has spent much effort to collect evidence about a system,
it will quite naturally want a return (some contribution to
the claims about the system) on its investment. This
unfortunately may push to make demands on the
argument-builders to go beyond what is feasible. A
possible way forward here, apart from empirical research
to improve the ability to link observed evidence to claims,
is to use subsets of the evidence to build a set of parallel
and separate arguments [1]: the set of arguments may not
allow stronger claims than each argument individually,
but it will pay off in the form of protection against the
consequences of hidden flaws in each individual one, and
thus increase confidence in these claims.
Another problem is - I believe – the extent to which
weak-based arguments are accepted, and used in decision
making. Here, multiple factors are relevant. The
argument-builders themselves are handling difficult
problems to start with. The dependence on judgement
reduces the chances for discovering errors while building
the argument; it also probably reinforces the gap between
technical experts and managers, by giving “official”
status to the existence of forms of esoteric knowledge of
the technical experts, that others cannot share or
challenge. And I think we must not neglect the effects of
even weakly based opinions on the development of
consensus in situations of uncertainty. They may deepen
an “uncertainty trough”, making decision makers more
confident in analyses and predictions than the technical
experts who originated them. And it is plausible that these
opinions will produce a psychological “anchor”,  an initial
opinion that will be revised less rapidly and radically than
it should be if new experience shows the revision to be
necessary, and a natural “landmark” in the negotiations
that surround an assurance case.
In recommending ways of building assurance cases,
we have too limited an understanding of this tangle of
technical, psychological and organizational factors.
4. Conclusions
This document is based on my experience in research
concerning safety critical systems, but the difficulties and
partial solutions seem common to many critical decisions
in designing or accepting complex computer and
computer-based systems.
The net conclusion is that there seem to be many ways
of improving the way judgement is used. Explicitly
building assurance cases certainly seems to be a step
forward, but  the communities building assurance cases
can benefit from better communication both between
themselves and with other disciplines, like psychology.
As in all engineering, the engineering of assurance
cases must be a matter of tradeoffs. The push to use as
much as possible of the available evidence to allow more
optimistic claims leads to more complex arguments
and/or more reliance on expert judgement, both factors
that tend in turn to make the assurance case less
trustworthy. The push towards more explicit and formal
arguments, that help to manage complexity and reduce
reliance on unaided judgement, may lead both to
diminishing returns and to new problems. Studying
– empirically – how these tradeoffs work out in the
various application areas and organizational cultures
would help much to assess the state of the art and identify
factors of success and failure. We need more research
focusing on assurance cases in themselves: how they are
built, how often they prove accurate, what mistakes are
made that matter, and – finally – which methods seem
effective in preventing these mistakes.
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